Private savings in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) declined from more than 11% of disposable income in 1970s to less than 8% in the 1980s, and only partially recovered (to less than 9%) in the 1990s. This paper analyzes the determinants of private savings in SSA, with the objectives of explaining its dismal savings behavior and ultimately identifying specific policies that could contribute to reversing the region's savings decline. Our shows that in SSA causality runs from growth to the investment (and perhaps to private savings), while a rise in the savings rate seems to Granger-cause an increase in investment. On the other hand, foreign aid Granger-causes a reduction in both savings and investment. The latter also seems to Granger-cause an increase in foreign aid, suggesting that African countries that increase investment tend to receive more aid. Our empirical analysis of private savings in SSA and other regions over 1970-95 suggests that Africa is "not different" in that private savings in Africa can be explained by the standard behavioral models in the literature. According to this analysis private savings in Africa lags behind other region (most notably the group of high performing Asian Economies: HPAEs) due to two sets of factors. First, per capita income and the young-age dependency ratio emerge as the most important contributors to the superior savings performance in HPAEs relative to high and median savers in Africa (SSAH and SSAM, respectively). Second, the high aid dependence in SSAM and to a lesser degree in SSAH has also contributed to HPAEs advantage in terms of savings performance. The combined effects of these factors substantially outweighed Africa's advantage due to the higher public savings and lower government consumption in HPAEs, which tends to reduce their private savings relative to that of Africa. Finally, analysis of three country-specific experiences from Africa: Kenya and Zimbabwe (with high private savings rates) and Botswana (with a low private savings rate) provides further insight into the savings process in SSA.
Bank Economic Review and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
Introduction
Sub-Saharan Africa's growth and overall economic performance over the last two decades or so, have commonly been described in recent scholarly writings in such "dire" terms such as "tragic" (Easterly and Levine, 1996) ; of a "crisis proportions" (Elbadawi and Ndulu, 1996) ; a tantamount to Africa's "economic decline" (Rodrik, 1997) ; or the root cause of Africa's "marginalization" in the world economy (Collier, 1991) 1 . Unfortunately, this assessment is not an exaggeration. For example, Africa's median annual per capita real GDP growth rate has declined steadily from more than 2.0% in 1970s, to -0.3% in 1980s and to -1.3% in 1990s. Over the whole period, Africa's growth performance has also lagged considerably relative to other regions, most notably relative to the high performing Asian economies (HPAEs). After noting that in 1996 SSA has managed to register its highest economic growth yet in two decades (total income grew at 5%), Rodrik (1997: p. 1) 2 cautions that, "the sobering reality is that it will take many years of growth at such levels (or better) to undo the damage that more than two decades of stagnation and decline have inflicted on most countries of the region."
Growth rates in SSA and other regions have been strongly associated with their respective private savings and investment performances. For example, private savings in SSA declined from 11.4% of disposable income in 1970s to only 7.5% in the 1980s, and only partially recovered (to less than 9%) in the 1990s. In addition, public savings in SSA remains low--at less than 3% of disposable income in the 1990s, declining from 4.3% in the 1980s. The slow down in gross domestic investment (as a ratio to GDP) was equally dramatic, where it declined steadily from 21.4% in 1970s to about 17.2% in the 1990s. Again, and similar to its comparative growth performance over the whole period, savings and investment in SSA lagged behind all other regions, specially the HPAEs, which achieved private savings (and investment) rates higher than those of SSA by 9.7% of GDP (or almost 17% of disposable income). Moreover, savings in SSA was not only lower relative to other regions, but it was also less stable3. Yet another worrisome feature of savings and investment in SSA is the heavy dependence on foreign savings, mostly ODA, to finance the investment-savings gap, which averaged slightly less than 11% of GDP for the 1970-95 period. This contrasts sharply with the case of HPAEs, where savings exceeded investment by 2.6% and 3. 4% for 1970-79 and 1980-89, respectively, and was virtually equal to it in 1990-95 (Tables 1.1 
& 1.2).
The urgent need for reinvigorating and sustaining growth in the developing world has led to the development of a plethora of theoretical frameworks, aimed at understanding the causative underpinnings of the observed empirical correlations among growth, savings and investment, as well as better explaining the determinants of each of the three pivotal macroeconomic performance indicators. While good progress has been made on the empirical modelling of growth and investment in SSA 4 and other developing regions, variation of private savings across countries and its evolution over time are relatively less understood . The presence of significant and negative African and Latin American dummies in cross-country regressions of private savings underscores the above point (e.g. Edwards, 1995; Mwega, 1996) .
On the direction of causation between savings and growth, review several theories ranging from the classical permanent income and life cycle hypotheses to the more recent and less conventional models. The latter--which emphasizes slow changing consumption habits (Carrol, Overland and Weil, 1994) , a mixture of strong consumption habits with uncertain incomes (Carrol and Weil, 1994) , or that consumers value both consumption and wealth (Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite, 1992; Fershtman and Weiss, 1993; Zou, 1993) --broadly suggests that growth drives savings. Moreover, it is argued that even when savings is assumed to automatically translate into capital accumulation and hence growth, failure to account for the reverse causation from growth to savings is likely to overstate the contribution of savings to growth (Carrol and Weil, 1994) .
At the empirical level however, the evidence on the causation from growth to savings is not conclusive . In our view, the analysis of private savings in SSA remains of immense policy importance even if growth in SSA was shown to drive both savings and investment. Admittedly--should we assume that growth drives savings--the immediate policy implication should be that policies aimed at directly promoting growth (such as technological innovation or further development of human capital) should be the prime focus of the attention. However, direct policies for promoting private savings may still be important for at least three reasons. First, even though capital accumulation may follow rather than lead the growth process, international evidence and most notably the experiences of the HPAEs, suggest that sustaining high rates of growth requires substantial levels of physical capital accumulation. Second, to the extent that SSA faces binding lending constraints in the international capital markets or external balance conditionality imposed by bilateral and external donors, national savings will drive aggregate investment (Summers, 1988) , and hence the former will influence the prospects for sustainability of growth. Third, the recent experiences of Mexico and Chile, for example, have shown that high national savings is a key medium-to-long-term prerequisite for avoiding financial crises and subsequent collapse of growth (Williamson, 1994) 5.
Subscribing to the above analysis, this paper analyzes the determinants of private savings in SSA, with the objectives of explaining its dismal savings behavior and ultimately identifying specific policies that could contribute to reversing the region's savings decline. As argued above, while raising savings is not sufficient for achieving sustained growth, it does appear to be a necessary condition for higher and sustained growth. In fact, identifying policies that support savings (and the policy distortions that inhibit savings) should be an essential element in any strategy aimed at achieving smooth transition to less aid dependence in SSA, given the intensity of the latter in SSA and the anticipated global reduction in foreign aid.
Section 2 analyzes causality between savings, investment, growth and foreign aid in SSA. Section 3 discuses the behavior of private savings in SSA and other developing regions, using the results of panel regressions of an empirical savings model over 1970-95 and covering 104 developing countries, of which 47 from SSA. Using the regression results, section 4 undertakes policy simulations--based on comparative analysis of the savings performances within SSA and relative to the superior savings performance of the HPAEs --to explain the main sources that drive savings performances for three sub-groupings from SSA (high, median and low savers 6 ) as well as for three country-specific experiences (Botswana, Kenya, Zimbabwe). It is hoped that this country-specific analysis shed some light on savings behavior in SSA beyond, but building upon, what could be explained by cross-country regressions. Section 5 concludes.
Causality Among Savings, Investment, Growth and Foreign Aid in SSA
The analysis of this section is aimed at establishing the causal links between these variables in the region taking into account their dynamic relationships (e.g. see Carroll and Weil 1994) . Traditional analyses of these relationships have focused on (a) the linkages between domestic savings and investment; (b) the effects of savings and investment on economic growth; and (c) more recently, the impact of foreign aid.
The first addresses the issue of whether national savings and domestic investment are strongly correlated. In an open economy, an increase in domestic savings need not be translated to increased domestic investment. With complete capital mobility, investment and savings could be independent of one another. With fully effective limitations on capital mobility, domestic savings are directly translated into investment. The extent of the correlation between savings and investment is therefore an empirical matter.
Empirical studies often find domestic savings to be highly correlated with investment (Feldstein and Horioka 1980 , Feldstein and Bachette 1991 , Bosworth 1993 . Many reasons are adduced for this high correlation. These include (i) productivity and other shocks affecting both desired savings and desired investment in the same direction even if capital was perfectly mobile across countries; (ii) an increase in domestic savings inducing an increase in investment particularly in large countries; (iii) capital controls to protect the domestic tax base and the balance of payments; (iv) the high transaction costs of purchasing securities and investing abroad, fears of expropriation, exchange rate risks and asymmetric information among countries which handicap foreign investors; and (v) limited access to external credit markets (Gordon and Bovenberg 1994) .
In SSA, the growing savings-investment gap, observed since the 1960s suggests that --unlke in other regions --savings and investment rates have not been closely associated during the last three decades.
The second addresses itself to whether economic growth follows savings and investment or whether the converse is the case. Neoclassical models such as Solow (1956) suggest that an increase in the savings rate generates higher growth only in the short-run, during the transition between steady states. Long-run equilibrium rate of growth is postulated to be exclusively a function of technological progress and labour force growth, both assumed to be exogenous. Models based on theories of endogenous growth pioneered by Roemer (1986) and Lucas (1988) , however, predict that higher savings and investment rates can result in a permanent increase in growth rates. With endogenous technological progress and accumulation of human capital, savings and investment will increase growth in the steady state. In addition, more recent studies (for example Levine and Renelt 1992 , De Long and Summers 1993 , Easterly and Rebelo 1993 , King and Levine 1994 find the investment rate to be one of the most important determinants of economic growth. Moreover, other studies using neoclassical production function analysis find that investment, not technological progress, was the main factor that explains the exemplary growth performance of Southeast Asia (e.g. Young 1994 ). The main argument behind these findings is that investment raises the amount of physical capital per worker, and therefore increases productivity.
The savings literature suggests that economic growth increases the income of workers relative to that of non-workers (the youth and retirees), and hence savings by this group could rise, for example to cater for increased consumption during retirement. On the other hand, the youth may, however, borrow against future income while workers may anticipate the increased growth and hence reduce savings (Tobin 1967 , Bosworth 1993 ). Moreover, growth may also reduce liquidity and borrowing constraints inducing households to increase consumption. Therefore, economic growth will increase savings if concentrated in households with high savings rates who are also characterized by strong habit persistence and inertia, with consumption adjusting with a lag to an increase in income, especially if the income growth is not anticipated. Also, with uncertain income, income growth could be positively correlated with savings through a precautionary (buffer stock) motive (Harrigan 1995) . Under the permanent income hypothesis, unexpected income will largely be saved.
There is a two-way causation if savings also increase growth. A virtuous cycle results as growth leads to more savings and this enhances economic growth. An important issue is which direction of causality is dominant: is rapid growth mainly due to a higher savings rate or does savings mainly respond to economic growth? If savings is a major growth determinant, increasing it would be a central aspect of the policy process whereas if the converse is true, focus should largely be on factors driving growth . The most definitive empirical work so far is Carroll and Weil (1994) , who use causality tests in their study and find that it is growth that mainly 'causes' changes in the savings rates. Perhaps inspired by this result, the Africa adjustment study (World Bank, 1994) , which notes that savings rates have traditionally been low in SSA and adjustment has had little impact on them so far, postulates that savings largely follow economic growth. Even though the study does not undertake formal causality analysis, it however, concluded that policy makers in SSA should not attempt to directly force up the savings rate, but should establish an environment that facilitates rapid accumulation, efficient resource use and rapid productivity growth. Therefore, formal testing of causality among growth, savings, investment and foreign aid in the context of SSA will be the focus of the analysis for the remainder of this section.
The variables we use to establish the direction of bivariate causality are gross national savings as a proportion of the national disposable income (SY), gross domestic investment as a proportion of GDP (IY), real GDP growth (GR) and foreign aid as a proportion of GDP (AIDY) 7 .
For each relationship, we investigate whether a variable X significantly adds to the explanation of variable Y, controlling for the history of Y (and vice versa) based on the following equations:
These equations were estimated using annual data which allows us to identify differences between the shortrun and longrun causality effects. Rather than experiment with different lag structures for every equation, four lags were used.
One problem with panel data estimation is that cross-sectional differences among countries may reflect country-specific characteristics--such as the efficiency of government, degree of corruption, the level of violence or the attitude of governments and population towards individual achievement or enterprise--that jointly influence savings, investment and economic growth as well as dependence on foreign aid (Carol and Weil 1994) . Since some of these country-specific effects are not easily quantifiable and are likely to be correlated with other observed explanatory variables, fixed effects estimation is commonly used to control for the former variables. Therefore, the success of this framework depends crucially on the extent to which the non-parametric proxies (dummies) for fixed effects adequately take into account the idiosyncratic aspects of country behavior--such as culture and development aspirations that cannot be easily observed or measured (Harrigan 1995) . This in effect takes out cross-sectional differences across countries, leaving 7 The correlation coefficients among the four variables: The savings-growth correlations are slightly higher than investment-growth correlations, but the stronger link is between savings and investment. The correlations are lowest with foreign aid and are negative with respect to both savings and growth.
only time-series variations to be explained. Tables 2.1(a)-(c) show both the pooled and the fixed effects results from estimating these equations for the sample of SSA countries in the World Bank World Savings database. The pooled results are less robust, with only causality from economic growth to investment rate significant. We therefore focus on the significant fixed effects results 8 .
First, the fixed effects results in Table 2 .1a show that the savings rate significantly Granger-causes the investment rate. The savings rate effects are quite persistent, increasing the aggregate coefficient from 0.13 in the shortrun to 0.37 in the longrun. As in the pooled results, the fixed effects results in Table 2 .1b show a significant positive causality (at 5% level) from economic growth to the investment rate. The growth effects on the investment rate are also persistent, increasing the aggregate coefficient from 0.14 in the shortrun to 0.48 in the longrun. These two results suggest that the data can be viewed alternatively through neoclassical glasses, or with an accelerator model in mind.
Except for the non-significant Granger-causality from economic growth to the savings rate, these results are to a large extent consistent with those derived by Attanasio et al (1998) from analysis of variants of the world sample. They are also, to some extent, supported by results from the other regions (the fixed effects results in Table 2 .2a and 2.2b for Asia and Latin America, respectively). First, the investment rate significantly Granger-causes a reduction in economic growth (at least in the short-run) in both regions. This counter-intuitive result may suggest that the aggregate investment was driven by public investment, as many countries have reduced their growth with a public investment boom.
Second, while there are significant effects from economic growth to investment in both regions (as in SSA), the effects from economic growth to the savings rate are only significant in Latin America. Third, the savings rate significantly Granger-causes an increase in the investment rate in Latin America (as in SSA) but not in Asia. Unlike in SSA, there are significant effects from the investment rate to the savings rate in these two regions, at least in the shortrun.
Going back to the SSA results, the fixed effects results in Table 2 .1b also show that the foreign aid ratio significantly Granger-causes a reduction in the savings rate, as expected from permanent income theory, 8 Another way to control for fixed effects is differencing the data. This however creates moving average disturbances which are correlated with the (once) lagged dependent variables. These variables were therefore instrumented using the GMM estimator proposed by Hansen (1982) and White (1982) . Instrumenting the (once) lagged dependent variables also accounts for endogeneity of X and Y in the two estimation equations. Internal instruments (lagged values of the explanatory variables) were utilized as proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al (1988) and Allerano and Bond (1991) , who suggest that one can use the orthogonal restrictions implied in the data dynamics to achieve efficiency if the error terms are serially uncorrelated. Differencing the data, however, and instrumenting the (once) lagged dependent variables gave less precise estimates, with none of the relations between the savings rate, investment rate, economic growth and foreign aid significant at least at the 10% level.
provided that aid is not entirely wasted. There is no significant bivariate relationship between aid and growth as predicted in the longrun by the Solow model.
Lastly, the fixed effects results in Table 2 .1c show that the foreign aid ratio and the investment rate seem to Granger-cause one another, at least at the 10% levels. The foreign aid ratio reduces investment while the investment rate Granger-causes an increase in the foreign aid ratio. The latter suggests that African countries that increase investment receive more foreign aid.
A literal interpretation of the fixed effects results is that, while the savings rate increases the investment rate, these two variables are not only irrelevant for initiating growth in SSA but are also unimportant for sustaining it. However, we would like to argue that domestic savings is likely to be very critical not only for increasing investment finance in SSA in the foreseeable future, but also for promoting economic growth. Also, avoiding a large investment-savings gap contributes to macroeconomic stability, and hence economic growth. Therefore, it is important to understand the factors that influence both the evolution of savings rates in SSA over time and across countries.
Determinants of Private Savings in SSA and Other Regions
The empirical analysis of private savings is based on a general functional form, encompassing a wide range of theoretical models derived from first principles. Our specification is broadly similar to other empirical models in the literature (e.g. Edwards, 1995; Masson et al, 1995; and Mwega, 1996) . Private savings is assumed to depend on five categories of variables 9 . Tables 3.1 contains the estimation results based on pooled OLS regressions 10 , where regional dummies for SSA and LAC are included to test whether the private savings rate in the two regions differ systematically from that of Asia. The Table shows that the Africa shift dummy is non-significant at the 10% level while that of Latin America is negative and significant at the 1% level. In this database, therefore, the African savings rate is not significantly different from that of Asia after taking into account the various fundamentals. In Section 4, we use the results of this Table for further analysis, focusing on the significant results in column 2.
Starting with per capita income and life cycle variables, the results show that per capita GPDI has a positive 9 More detailed discussion of channels and effects of these determinants is contained in Mwega (1996) . 10 An expanded version of the paper (Elbadawi and Mwega, 1999) contains regressions results based on fixed effects and GMM models. However, controlling for fixed effects substantially changed the precision of several coefficients because some variables such as demographics change slowly over time; and because of multicollinearity among variables. Per capita income, the young-age dependency ratio and urbanization, for example, no longer had significant coefficients Among financial variables, the ex post real rate of interest coefficient was no longer significant although the spread between the lending and the deposit interest rates; and the degree of financial depth (M2Y) now had positive and significant coefficients. Also, the proportion of private sector credit to GPDI had a larger negative and significant coefficient (of size -.22 to -.27). In addition, inflation was no longer significant. Differencing the variables in GMM-IV estimation reduced the precision of the pooled point estimates even further. Only three variables remained significant: growth in terms of trade (coefficient of 0.06 is in the range estimated earlier); the public savings rate (with a larger offset coefficient of about one); and the proportion of private sector credit to GPDI (with a reduced coefficient of -0.17).
and generally significant coefficient (of about size .033) among these LDCs. Growth in per capita GPDI also has a positive and highly significant coefficient, suggesting the existence of a virtuous cycle between private savings and growth. A 1% increase in economic growth raises the private savings rate by .053-.081%age points. Similarly, terms of trade growth have a positive and significant coefficient, with a 1% improvement in terms of trade increasing the private savings rate by .11-.12%age points. An improvement in the terms of trade increases incomes and hence savings, especially if the improvement is expected to be transitory. This effect is particularly important in SSA where exports are limited to a few primary commodities, which are sold in highly volatile markets. This results is corroborated by other empirical studies (e.g. Ostry and Reinhart 1992 , Bevan et al 1992 , Azam 1995 . Bevan et al for example analyze the impact of the 1976-77 coffee boom on rural savings in Kenya. Proceeds from this boom -caused by a frost in Brazil -were fully passed on to the farmers and they show that about 60% was saved.
Two demographic variables -the young-age dependency ratio and urbanization -have negative and significant coefficients. The life-cycle model predicts a negative relationship between the private savings rate and the dependency ratios, provided that the life-cycle motive for savings to finance retirement is important. Urbanization may also be expected to reduce the savings rate as the precautionary savings associated with the volatility of incomes in agricultural sector are reduced. This seems to dominate the other influence due to that urban dwellers may have better access to financial instruments that induces an increase in savings.
Second, we take up fiscal policy variables. Public savings was shown to have a negative and significant effect. An increase in public savings rate by 1% reduces the private savings rate by about 0.6%age points. General government consumption has a positive and significant coefficient of about .68-.77. For a given public savings rate, policies that reduce government consumption expenditures (and reduce tax revenues) would have a negative impact on the private savings rate. This result suggests that the private sector places positive value on government consumption (Edwards, 1995) .
Third, turning to the financial variables, the pooled results show the ex post real rate of interest coefficient which captures financial liberalization (or the absence of financial repression) to have a positive and significant coefficient (of size .02-.04), although the spread between the lending and the deposit interest rates is non-significant. Similarly, the degree of financial depth (M2Y) has a non-significant coefficient. The degree to which financial constraints are binding was proxied by the proportion of domestic credit allocated to the private sector relative to GPDI. The coefficient of this variable is negative and significant (with a size of about -.16), suggesting that liquidity and borrowing constraints are important among these LDCs.
Fourth, under the category of macroeconomic instability and volatility, the pooled results show that inflation has a negative and significant coefficient. Inflationary expectations lead to a lower real rate of interest and adversely affect private savings through the McKinnon-Shaw mechanism. High inflation may also signal a lack of credibility in government policies as well as reduced expected return on savings. The result suggests that the above two effects of inflation more than outweigh its potential effect through reduction of real wealth (if due to structural rigidities they are not fully indexed) and consumption, which would lead to to an increase in savings.
Fifth, ending with the open economy variable, the results suggest that the degree of foreign aid dependence as measured by the ratio of foreign aid to GDPI has a negative and significant coefficient, with an almost one-for-one offset relationship. While foreign aid has traditionally been regarded as complementary to national savings11, a recently resurgent literature on the macroeconomic effects of foreign aid has found that higher aid is translated mostly into consumption not investment (Boone 1994 , Obstfeld 1995 . This means that foreign savings will on average act as a substitute to domestic savings by easing liquidity constraints or by inducing Dutch disease effects. For Africa, as the world's main aid recipient (relative to the size of its economy) the issue of the impact of aid on private savings is of utmost importance to both the donor community and African policy makers.
Varieties of Savings Experiences in SSA
Despite the overall weak savings performance of SSA relative to other regions, most notably HPAEs, it is important to emphasize that SSA is not an undifferentiated whole in terms of its savings performance. For example, the median savings rate (as a ratio to disposable income) during 1970-95 for the high SSA savers (SSAH) is higher by 9.8% than the rate for the median savers (SSAM), which in turn is higher by more than 4.7% compared to that of the low SSA savers (SSAL) ( Table 4 .1). However, even the savings rates of SSAH (at 17.9%) remain much lower than the staggering HPAEs' rates, which averaged more than 24.8%. Understanding the sources of this superior savings performance in the HPAEs relative to SSA as well as the diversity of savings within the SSA, should therefore, be an important policy objective. Table 4 .1 contains historical simulations on the decomposition of differences in savings rates between HPAEs and each of the SSA high and median groups based on regression 2 of Table 3 .1. The decomposition is based on computing the contribution for each of the variables found to be significantly associated with private savings, and are given by multiplying the variable mean for the group in question by its respective estimated coefficient. The differences between the contributions to HPAEs and to the SSAH (SSAM) provide the decomposition of the total excess of savings in HPAEs relative to SSAH (SSAM). A similar decomposition was also conducted for the difference between savings in SSAM relative to SSAL. These experiments allows us to ask the following highly policy-relevant questions: what might low 11 Complementarity can be derived from certain poverty trap models (traps which foreign savings inflow helps unlock) or models where countries converge to common steady state income levels (Boone 1994 ). If incomes converge, then poor countries will save a part of the transfers as these are temporary. LDCs also may have a higher marginal productivity of capital which induces them to postpone consumption to the future. Foreign aid may also be utilized to construct infrastructure, leading to a reduction in distortionary taxes and hence promoting economic growth. The above assumes that aid was given in the context of a "good" policy environment, where the former was found to be conducive to growth only under this environment (Burnside and Dollar, 1996) . When, however, incomes across countries do not converge, the flow of foreign aid is likely to be perceived as permanent and therefore largely spent on consumption.
savings SSA countries do to at least raise their private savings rates to reach the median for SSA? or what might medium and high savings SSA do to approach the East Asian frontier?.
Starting with the HPAEs relative to SSAH and SSAM comparisons, the following points could be made. First, per capita GPDI and young-age dependency ratio emerge as the most important and robust contributors to the superior savings performance in HPAEs relative to the two African comparators. For example in 1970-95, the differential per capita GPDI and the young-age dependency ratio were, respectively equal to 18.0 and 6.2% (14.4 and 9.2%) in favor of HPAEs relative to SSAH (SSAM). Second, the high aid dependence in SSAM and to a lesser degree in SSAH has also contributed to HPAEs advantage in terms of savings performance. Due to this effect, savings in SSAM was simulated to have lagged behind that of HPAEs by 3.7% in the 1970-95 period. In the case of the SSAH the shortfall attributed to aid dependance was much lower, at 1.7%. Third, as expected the first round effect 12 of the higher public savings in HPAEs relative to the two SSA groups has had a negative contribution in HPAEs relative to SSA. However, this effect was relatively small (it reached a maximum of -2.5% for the SSAH) compared to the huge contribution in favor of savings in HPAEs provided by per capita income and life cycle variables. Moreover, higher government consumption produces a positive contribution in favor of savings in SSA that compounds the negative effects of public savings on the HPAEs. Fourth, and perhaps not surprisingly the contributions of financial and macroeconomic 13 variables were not very consequential. However, the share of private sector credit in GDPI has a large impact (5.7% and 5.4% respectively) in favour of SSA 14 while the growth of terms of trade favour private savings in HPAEs by about 1% age point.
In terms of the sources behind the better savings performance in SSAM relative to SSAL countries, the patterns are broadly similar to the previous analysis, but there are also some differences. First, again the per capita income effect is very important where it contributed 4.2% to the better savings performance in the SSAM countries. This finding is important because it underscores the importance of raising per capita incomes within SSA. However, unlike the comparisons between SSA and HPAEs, the higher dependency ratio in the SSAM countries produces a negative contribution to the savings of this group relative to SSAL. This results in a net positive contribution for life cycle variables to savings in SSAL relative to SSAM. Second, the net effect of the other life cycle variables is however, rather negligible. This leaves aid dependence as the only variable providing a relatively appreciable contribution (at 2.0%) to the higher private savings rate in SSAM relative to SSAL. Third, the rather marginal role for macroeconomic and financial variables in explaining the divergent savings performance between HPAEs and SSA is also corroborated in the comparison between SSAM and SSAL as well.
Despite the useful insight provided by the analysis of Table 4 .1 into the main sources causing savings to diverge across countries, some major gaps, however, still remain. For example, in the HPAEs and SSA analysis, the cross-country model tends to under-predict savings rates in SSA high and low savings countries, as reflected by a fairly large negative unexplained residuals (Table 4 .1). On the other hand, the model tends to slightly overstate the savings rates in SSAM savings countries. Therefore, further insight into the savings process in SSA may be gained by analyzing some country-specific experiences.
Some Country-Specific Experiences
This will be a selective analysis of only three SSA countries, two of them (Kenya, Zimbabwe) are high savers relative to other African countries; while Botswana has one of the lowest private savings rates in SSA. We are hastened to note however, that Botswana's unusually high public savings rate puts it as one of the top savers (in terms of aggregate national savings) in the world. The experiences of these countries presents some very interesting anomalies, which hopefully should help highlight the role of some variables or socio-institutional structures that may not be easily captured by the regression model.
Kenya and Zimbabwe:
In our view, the most important explanation for the high private savings rates in these two countries is provided by a combination of two factors: the presence of a relatively dense and diversified financial and banking sectors and a policy of institutional "forced" savings. The "forced" savings policy was based on an elaborate ensemble of regulations for the appropriation of private savings funds to finance fiscal expenditure 15 , and until recently (specially for the case of Zimbabwe) it was also reinforced by an extensive and apparently effective system of foreign exchange and import controls. The mechanism for the mobilization of "forced" savings in Zimbabwe is succinctly described in Elbadawi and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991; p. 7-8) , "to generate a surplus which finances 100% or more of the public deficit since 1986/87, the private sector raised significantly its savings rate: since 1984/85 it exceeds 20% of GDP and finances more than 100% of the economy's gross domestic investment. This private savings rate is very high for a developing economy--a counterpart is very low private consumption rate, barely exceeding 50% of GDP during the second half of the 1980s. High private savings channeled through Zimbabwe's developed financial system to the public sector is probably a result of restrictions on private consumption (particularly imported consumer durables) and on formal or illegal capital outflows...". Perhaps to a lesser extent than Zimbabwe, Kenya has also accorded a fair degree of protection to domestic industry until the early 1990s.
The history of the Zimbabwe's banking and financial system dates back to the 1890s, and is composed of nine banking and financial institutions, including: commercial banks, accepting houses, discount houses, finance houses, post office savings funds, building societies, insurance companies, pension and provident funds and savings clubs. The robustness and diversity of the Zimbabwean financial sector has made it possible to mobilize small savings from a large number of clients from the rural and small town communities, through small institutions such as the post office savings funds--which realized their largest expansion during the first half of the 1980s. The assets of these funds (as a ratio to total assets of the financial sector) rose from 13.4% in 1983 to more than 20% in 1986, almost half the assets of commercial banks, which are the most important institutions for mobilization of private savings in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, commercial banks and other more formal financial institutions have managed to mobilize large sums of savings from the corporate and commercial sectors (Moyo, 1996) . The financial sector in Kenya is also considered one of the deepest and most diversified in SSA. A measure of the success of this sector in mobilizing private savings is reflected by its contribution to gross domestic savings, which averaged about 40% during the second half of the 1980s. Another important contributor is non-financial private corporations which contributed an additional 36% to gross domestic savings during the same period (Kwasa, 1992) .
Despite the relatively superior savings performances of the two countries relative to most other African countries, two important questions arise: what might these countries do to increase their private savings rates relative to the HPAEs levels?; and what is the likely effect of trade and financial liberalization introduced by both countries since late 1980s on private savings? The answer to the first question appears to be fairly straightforward and is readily obtained from the pooled savings model. Simply, the two countries need to increase their per capita incomes, where in particular the role of macroeconomic stability and macroeconomic competitiveness may be critical. Moreover, the two countries would also need to reduce their age-dependency ratios. Regarding the role of financial liberalization, and consistent with the crosscountry evidence of this paper, country-specific evidence for a range of African countries suggests that it appears to have no robustly positive impact on savings. While Kenya's savings rate remains stable between the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, Zimbabwe had its savings rate fall in the 1990s (Ndung'u, 1997) . Why financial liberalization may not have yet led to a surge in private savings in these two countries may be related to its failure to create further financial deepening or to increase the efficiency of the financial sector, especially for the case of Zimbabwe. While the M2/GDP ratio increased from 38% in 1980 to around 50% by 1994 in Kenya, it actually slightly declined from over 50% to 48% between the two years in Zimbabwe. A more compelling evidence however, is the perverse rise in the spread between the lending and the deposit rate (an indicator of financial market inefficiency) during financial liberalization. In Kenya it increased from just over 5% in 1989 to more than 18% in 1994, and in Zimbabwe it increased from 1.4% to more than 8% in 1994 (Ndung'u, 1997) .
In the final analysis it appears that the ability of the two countries to maintain relatively high levels of private savings may reflect that the combination of "forced" savings (due to that only partial trade liberalization have been effected so far) and dense and relatively robust financial markets are still in force. Therefore, an adjustment into higher "voluntary" savings, and hopefully more efficient investment and therefore higher growth, has yet to be started in the two countries.
Botswana:
The experience of Botswana is perhaps one of the few examples of countries being able to achieve high and sustained growth despite persistently low private savings. Clearly, given its growth record, the unusually high public savings must have more than compensated for the low private savings. On average, private savings rates in Botswana during 1970-95 have lagged behind the SSA median rate by about 3.5% 16 . In contrast to its private savings records, Botswana managed a an impressive growth record, including more than 11% average annual per capita growth rate for eleven years (1969-79), followed by almost 7% annual growth rate for another eleven years (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) . By any standard this county has indeed earned its position as one of the leading countries in the developing world to achieve a sustainable transition into high growth and low macroeconomic instability (Elbadawi and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1997 ).
Out of staggering gross domestic savings rates, which averaged about 42% in 1985-89 and more than 33% during the first half of 1990s, more than 75% are accounted for by public savings. Government revenue in Botswana was given a tremendous boost by the increase in the production and export of diamonds. The government collects, " between 75 and 82% of the profit of the diamond industry through a combination of royalty payments, profit tax, withholding tax on remitted dividends, and dividends received by virtue of its 50% share-holding in the diamond mining company Debswana." (Hope, 1997: p. 107 ). However, experiences of other well endowed resource-based economies suggest that Botswana's unusual record of public sector savings awes more to prudent fiscal management than to the sheer magnitude of its wealth. Naturally, the key test of the macroeconomic prudence of the authorities in Botswana was provided by the challenge of managing the boom in the mining sector (diamonds). It has been generally agreed that In the words of Norberg and Blomstrom (1993: pp. 176-177) , "..the spending effects of the diamond boom have been small, something which is mainly due to government policy. Since the diamond industry is state owned, the government controls the revenues. The revenues have mainly been used to promote national income, rather than to subsidize different sectors (such as import-substituting manufacturing) and support various interest groups. To maximize national income, a large proportion of the revenues from diamonds have been invested, not in Botswana, but in foreign banks and firms. By sterilizing revenues abroad and executing a non-expansive monetary policy at home, the inflationary pressure has diminished and the negative effect of the diamond boom have been reduced."
Despite its enormous success in the areas of growth and management of its non-renewable resource-based economy, Botswana would need to substantially enhance its private savings rates without necessary reducing its current public savings. Three arguments could be cited in support of this view. First, since the mainstay of the economy is a non-renewable resource base, intertemporal welfare maximization suggests that optimal savings rates--consistent with maintenance of current consumption rates in the post-resource era--could be as high as 50% of GDP (Elbadawi and Majd, 1992 ). An "optimum" or "desired" savings rate (relative to the GDP) has been computed at about 37% for countries---such as Egypt, Turkey and Indonesia---which only partially depend on a non-renewable resource base, such as oil; for other countries that are more heavily dependent on oil, such as Saudi Arabia and UAE, the computed optimum savings rate could be as high as 60%. Being heavily dependent on a non-renewable resource base, Botswana clearly belongs to the latter group17. Therefore, enhanced private savings would be required for bridging the gap relative to the welfare maximizing rate for this type of economies. Second, and as noted above, despite Botswana's enormous success in sustaining high growth and prudently managing the mineral sector, an alarming body of evidence suggests that this growth has not been equitable and has co-existed with both poverty and unemployment (Hope and Edge, 1996) . This suggests that an increasing share of public savings should be spent on social sectors. The implication of this for sustaining growth in the future, is that more private savings will be needed to support other vital types of investment outlays. Moreover, given the volatility of the mining sector, a high and a stable private investment base should always be a major policy objective. Third, even though the partial crowding out effect of the huge public savings in Botswana will unavoidably reduce private savings 18 , other policy-induced factors have also contributed to this outcome. One factor is financial repression (even after rising significantly, real interest rates in Botswana are still negative during the 1990s at -0.3%, Ndung'u, 1997). More importantly, however, is the lack of deep and diversified financial and banking sector.
It appears that the need for raising private savings is now well understood in Botswana. For example, the private sector is now calling for a major drive towards privatization of parastatals--through the primary method of share offering--as the most effective method for mobilizing private savings (Hope,1997) .
Conclusions
Sub-Saharan Africa's growth performance over the last two decades or so has been very poor in relation to other regions especially the high performing Asian economies (HPAEs). This poor performance has also been reflected in savings and investment performances, both of which have declined substantially in the 1970s and 1980s with only a partial recovery in the 1990s. A worrisome feature of savings and investment in SSA is the heavy dependence on foreign savings, mostly ODA, to finance the investment-savings gap. This paper focuses on the determinants of the private savings in SSA, with the objectives of explaining its dismal savings behavior and ultimately identifying specific policies that could contribute to reversing the region's savings decline. While raising savings is not sufficient for achieving sustained growth, it does appear 17 The framework used in the derivation of the optimum rate is a small open economy optimizing model comprizing of two assets (e.g. oil, non-oil). The optimum savings rate can be solved in this model as an explicit function of: the life span of the reserve of the non-renewable resource, expected future prices of the resource, the real returns of investment and desirable savings rate in the post resource era. Examples of this literature includes: Dervis, Martin and van Wijnbergen (1984); Gelb (1985a,b); Farzin (1989) and Askari (1990) , to mention a few examples.
18 According to the model simulations (not reported) this effect causes private savings in Botswana to be less by 12% than the median savings rates in SSA for the 1990-95 period.
to be a necessary condition for higher and sustained growth.
Based on fixed effects estimation, results for SSA suggest causality runs from growth to investment (and perhaps to the private savings) which is consistent with international evidence in this area (e.g. Carroll and Weil, 1994) . A rise in the savings also seems to Granger-cause an increase in investment. On the other hand, foreign aid Granger-causes a reduction in both savings and investment. The latter also seems to Granger-cause an increase in foreign aid, so that African countries that increase investment receive more aid.
The empirical analysis of the private savings in SSA and other regions over 1970-95 permits the following broad conclusions. First, accounting for other determinants of private savings, regional dummies for SSA and LAC were included in the regressions to test whether the two regions differ systematically from that of Asia. The results show that the Africa shift dummy is non-significant at the 10% level while that of Latin America is negative and significant at the 1% level. Second, our results suggest that both of per capita GPDI and its growth as well as the growth in terms of trade have positive and significant coefficients. Both the young-age dependency ratio and urbanization have negative and significant coefficients. Third, the public savings coefficient is negative and highly significant, with an offset coefficient of about -0.6% points. General government consumption, on the other hand, has a positive and significant coefficient so that the private sector places positive value on government consumption (Edwards, 1995) . The ex post real rate of interest coefficient is positive and significant while the private sector credit ratio has a negative and significant coefficient. Both inflation and the foreign aid have negative and significant coefficients.
The regression results were used to analyze the main sources that drive savings performances for three country-specific experiences as well for three sub-groupings from SSA (high, median and low savers). The analysis is based on historical simulations of the sources of the differences in savings rates between HPAEs and each of the SSA low, median and high savings groups. The decomposition was based on computing the contribution for each of the variables found to be significantly associated with private savings, given by multiplying the variable mean for the group in question by its respective estimated coefficient.
Historical simulations of the differences in savings rates between four country groups suggest that these differences are accounted for by the following factors. First, per capita income and the young-age dependency ratio emerge as the most important contributors to the superior savings performance in HPAEs relative to the two African comparators (high and median savers: SSAH and SSAM, respectively). Second, the high aid dependence in SSAM and to a lesser degree in SSAH has also contributed to HPAEs advantage in terms of savings performance. Third, the higher public savings in HPAEs relative to the two SSA groups has had a negative contribution in HPAEs relative to SSA, although this effect was relatively small compared to the huge contribution in favor of savings in HPAEs provided by the life cycle variables. Moreover, higher government consumption (especially in SSAH) produces positive contributions in favor of the private savings in SSA that compounds the negative effects of public savings on the HPAEs. Fourth, the contributions of financial and macroeconomic variables were not very consequential, except for the private sector credit ratio that favors SSA. Fifth, when SSAM is compared to SSAL countries, the patterns are broadly similar, but there are also some differences. First, the per capita income effect is very important, but the higher dependency ratio in the SSAM countries produces a negative contribution to the savings of this group relative to SSAL. This results in a net positive contribution for life cycle variables to savings in SSAL relative to SSAM. Second, aid dependence provides a relatively appreciable contribution to the higher private savings rate in SSAM relative to SSAL. Third, the rather marginal role for macroeconomic and financial variables in explaining the divergent savings performance between HPAEs and SSA is also corroborated in the comparison between SSAM and SSAL as well. Finally, further insight into the savings process in SSA is provided by analyzing the three country-specific experiences of Kenya and Zimbabwe (with high private savings) and Botswana (with a low private savings). "Sum"' is the sum of the Granger-causality coefficients in the estimation equations. The "Longrun Coeff" is derived by dividing this '"Sum" by one minus the sum of coefficients of the lagged dependent variables. The p-value is the probability that the sum of the estimated Granger-causality coefficients are equal to zero. ?LRYPC Change in LRYPC (i.e. Growth in real per capita GPDI).
?LTOT Change in log terms of trade.
RDRATE
Real deposit rate of interest, expressed as log(1+?), to reduce the range of variation.
M2Y
M2 as a proportion of GPDI.
GPS
Central government savings as proportion of GPDI. These savings, as in GPRS, are controlled for capital gains or losses due to inflation.
D15
Youth dependency ratio, measured by the ratio of population under 15 years to population 15-64 years.
D65
The elderly dependency ratio, measured by the ratio of population over 64 years to population 15-64 years.
URBAN
The degree of urbanization, measured by the proportion of urban to total population.
GCNY
General government consumption expenditures as a proportion of GPDI.
RSPREAD
The spread between lending and borrowing interest rates given in the database.
DCPCY
The proportion of the stock of private sector domestic credit to GPDI INFL Inflation, expressed by log (1+p), to reduce the range of variation.
AIDY Dollar foreign aid as a proportion of dollar GPDI. The data for the dollar foreign aid were derived from a compilation by Charles C. Chang et. al. (1998) , "Measuring Aid Flows", The World Bank. They define effective development assistance (EDA) as the sum of grant-equivalents and grants, excluding technical assistance. To derive the dollar GDPI, the exchange rate given in the World Savings database
